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ABSTRACT
The paper is primarily concerned with the Finnish government's management of the
Finnish economic situation after the Second World War. Overall, post-war policies
were dominated by three main goals, first, how to deal with the war reparation pay-
ments required under the harsh political terms of the 1944 Armistice Treaty; sec-
ondly, to ensure the settlement of the Karelian refugees and demobilised veterans;
and thirdly, the raising of production and the standard of living, including the easing
of the rationing system. The focus is especially in analysing how this was financed
externally and by the state economy without hyperinflation and considerable indebt-
edness of the state. From the point of view of the government finances, the financing
of the war was transformed to the financing of the war reparations, the compen-
sations due to the war and the settlement of the homeless people. The paper has
drawn on the findings of the Studies of the Economic Growth of Finland and other
sources and can be seen as a sequel to a previous article on the Finnish war econo-
my between 1939–1945.2
Introduction: the peace terms
Any peace  after  a  total  war,  like  the  Second World  War,  whether  won or  lost,  is
likely to prove a complicated economic matter for an industrial society. It poses
questions to do with demobilization and reconstruction, and with the ending of
martial laws offers a test of democracy, while the normalization of economic in-
stitutions has to be carried on in a situation loaded with all kinds of economic and
political expectations. After the Second World War for most Finns normalization
meant a return to the standard of living and conditions of 1938, but very many
Finns also wanted a changed economic system. The first socialist country of
the world, the Soviet Union, had emerged from the war as a second superpow-
1 The paper was first presented at the XII Congress of the International Economic History Association,
Session  C44  (The  economic  history  of  World  War  II  and  its  aftermath),  Madrid,  in  August  1998.  I  am
highly indebted to Professor Hugh Rockoff of Rutgers University for organizing the session, and for his
(and two unknown referee's) comments and suggestions on the paper.
2 Pihkala, Erkki, War consumption and Financing in Finland in the Second World War, in The Sinews of
War. Essays on the Economic History of World War II, Ed. Geofrey T. Mills & Hugh Rockoff. Ames: Iowa
State UP 1993.
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er and many thought that its economic system - planned socialism - was the only
remedy for postwar economic and social problems.
In September 1944 the Soviet Union made armistices with Rumania,
Hungary and Finland. For Finland this preliminary peace treaty meant that the
areas, Karelia and Salla, ceded after the Winter War in March 1940 were again
surrendered. In addition, Petsamo was lost, including its newly-exploited nickel
deposits as well as the outlet to the Arctic Ocean. The Hanko base was substituted
for Porkkala, and leased to the Soviet Union for fifty years; it was located only
twelve miles from the Finnish capital, and moreover, could be supplied by rail
through Finnish territory. Furthermore, access to the Gulf of Finland, with the
Estonian side being in Soviet hands, could now be barred by coastal artillery.
Each of three countries, Finland, Rumania and Hungary, were obliged to pay war
reparations to the Soviet Union totalling 300 million US gold dollars in 1938
prices over six years: for Finland this was equivalent to one and a half times 1938
exports.
In addition, the decisions of the Potsdam Conference of 1945 and the Peace
Treaty of Paris of 1947 imposed on Finland the restitution of property removed
from Karelia and East Karelia which had been occupied by the Finnish armed
forces between 1941-44, and reconstruction of the property destroyed there. This
also applied to the Finnish property which had been taken there after June 1941,
when the new war with the Soviet Union started. German assets in Finland and
Finnish debts to Germany accumulated in 1941-44 were allocated to the Soviet
Union as part of the German settlement. The expenses of the Allied Control
Commission  and  the  War  Reparation  Commission  were  also  to  be  paid  by
Finland, but these were minor compared to the costs of the Soviet occupation
army in Hungary or Rumania.
The Finnish army of over 600,000 men and women, some 16 per cent of the
total population, was to be demobilized before December 1944. The strength of
the  armed  forces  was  then  to  be  limited  to  42,000  men,  the  Finnish  navy  to  a
maximum volume of 10,000 tons and the air force to 60 combat planes. Atomic
weapons, missiles, magnetic sea mines, submarines, motor torpedo boats and
bombers were forbidden, as were paramilitary organizations and civic militia. The
German force in North Finland, a strong mountain army of some 200,000, was to
be expelled from Finnish territory. The Soviet Army did not join in this War of
Lapland against Germany, which occurred mainly in October-November 1944,
although the last Germans did not leave the northwestern tip of Finland until April
1945.
The Armistice Treaty also ordered Finland to convict, as war criminals, the
President of the country and seven cabinet ministers for not conducting active
peace policies. They were sentenced to be jailed for some years by a Finnish
special court under pressure from the Soviets, but thereafter returned to high
positions. No one was executed.
Finnish compliance with the terms of the Armistice Treaty was closely moni-
tored by the Soviet-led Allied Control Commission until its departure from Hel-
sinki in September 1947, after the ratification of the Peace Treaty of Paris. The
Paris  Peace  Treaty  of  February  1947 had confirmed the  obligations  of  the  Armi-
stice Treaty. The transfer of German property and Finnish war-time debts to Ger-
many then started. The signatories of the Paris Peace Treaty (the Soviet Union,
the United Kingdom, the Union of South Africa, etc, but not the United States of
America, which had not been involved in the war with Finland), however, did
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not require Finland to relinquish the arsenal which it had acquired as booty or had
purchased during the war years. These armaments proved sufficient to equip a dozen
infantry divisions, a means of self defence, although Finland's strategic position
clearly left it at the mercy of the Soviet Union in the devastated and problem-ridden
Europe of the immediate post-war years.3 Martial law was repealed in November
1947.
The legacy of the war
Finnish military wartime deaths numbered some 85,000 with civilian deaths at about
2,000, in total some 2.2 per cent of the prewar population. The number of injured was
about 200,000, but until 1964 only 68,000 had received compensation for their
wartime traumas. The Finnish cities had not been badly damaged since the Soviet air
raids had been successfully repelled and although Lapland was '”burned down” by the
Germans this was of relatively small-scale importance. The physical damage caused
by the war amounted to one-fiftieth of the national wealth. The costs of the war,
excluding territorial losses came to some 20-33 per cent annually of the Finnish gross
domestic product between 1940-44, or 27 per cent on average, military spending in
1939 and 1945 were about 10 per cent of the Finnish GDP in comparison.4 The war
economy had been financed in19401944 by restricting private expenditure to below
80 per cent of that before the war, by severally constraining investment, by running
deficits on the current account, and through heavy taxation including an inflation tax.5
There was no racial genocide, and the few Finnish Jews of military age served as
normal in the armed forces. At the end of the war 422,000 refugees from the ceded
areas, or 12 per cent of the total population, together with the veterans, were waiting
to be resettled. In addition there were 160,000 evacuees from Northern Finland, of
which 56,000 had gone to Sweden. After the armistice was signed there neither was a
wave of terror nor much crime, and the employment problem until 1949 proved to be
a shortage of labour rather than unemployment.
Finland made the transition from war to peace with its most important institu-
tions unchanged, that is the civil service, the courts of law, the core of the army and
the police. The biggest internal political problem proved to be the increased support
for communist ideas. In the elections of March 1945 the Communist-led Democratic
League of the People of Finland gained 25 per cent of the seats in the Parliament
and formed a coalition government with the Social Democrats and the
Agrarian Party who also won a 25 per cent share each. Many of the new com-
3 Nevakivi Jukka, Finnish Security Policy in a Geostrategic Perspective in Security and Insecurity;
Perspectives on Finnish and Swedish Defence and Foreign Policy; Ed. Gunnar Artéus & Jukka Nevakivi,
Försvarsskolans Acta B3. Stockholm; Probus 1997, 19-24; and Vehviläinen, Olli, Finland´s transition from
war to peace in Bulletin of the International Committee for the History of the Second World War, N:o 27/28,
1995 (1945; Consequences and sequels of the Second World War. 18th International Congress of Historical
Sciences, Montreal 1995); 120-129.
4 Nummela, Ilkka, Inter arma silent revisores rationum: Toisen maailmansodan aiheuttama taloudellinen
rasitus Suomess, 1939-1952 (with English summary: The Financial Burden imposed on Finland by the
Second World War during the Period 1939-1952), Studia Historica Jyväskyläensia 46. Jyväskylä 1933, 297-
301. The value of territorial cessions was estimated by Nummela to about ten months´ worth of the GDP for
1938.
5 Pihkala, War consumption, 113.
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munist deputies had been imprisoned during the war. The years 1945-48 have thus
been called 'the years of danger' because of the risk of a Communist coup d'état
and /or a Soviet invasion. The Communists, however, lost ground markedly in the
July 1948 elections and were then left outside the new cabinets.
In many European countries, as in Great Britain and France, the
nationalisation of certain major branches of production and services (coal, steel,
railways etc.) was common. In Finland there were also similar demands and a
committee was set up to plan it. However, such enthusiasm was over by 1948, and
in the end no branch of the economy or company was in fact nationalized. This
was partly because of the continuing strict regulation of the economy. Rationing
lasted in some form until the mid-1950s, and price controls until the 1980s. The
improving standard of living, especially for the lower income groups, also
satisfied the majority within the scope of the existing economic system. There was
little that could be called 'national economic planning' if we exclude the incomes
policies pursued by the government. State investment in the basic industries and
the granting of import licences by the Licence Office and currency for imports by
the Bank of Finland were mainly aimed at pragmatically removing production
bottlenecks. On the other hand, even though the Finnish state traditionally owned
some big companies, only the distribution of alcohol constituted a state monopoly,
a position occurring after the abolition of prohibition in 1932.
Walking the tightrope
In 1947 Soviet-dominated governments were set up in the Eastern and Central
Europe, the Cominform was formed in September, while an attempted Communist
takeover took place in Greece in December leading to a civil war. In February
1948 the Communists took over in Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union made
“friendship agreements” with the countries they had occupied. In April 1948 the
Soviets threatened Berlin with a blockade, which beginning in June lasted until
May 1949. NATO was not established until April 1949. In Finland in 1947 the
Communists organized a series of strikes with strong pay demands from the un-
ions and demands for the socialization of production which threatened overall
economic stability. In April 1948 there were even rumours of a Communist take-
over in the country.
Given this political background Finland in April 1948 considered it best to
accept a Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Pact (the FCMA pact) as
demanded by the Soviet Union. The first crucial stipulation of this pact was that
Finland should protect its territory against any German attack or attack from Ger-
man allies, so that Finland could not be used for an attack on Soviet territory. If
necessary, the pact stipulated cooperation with Soviet forces. A second stipula-
tion, different from other friendship agreements, was that consultations should be
held with the Soviet Union on whether such a threat was imminent, and what
measures should then be taken. According to the latest research, the FCMA pact
watered down a Communist plan to bring about a political shift to the left because
of an on-going right-wing conspiracy. It also diminished the need for the Soviets
to occupy Finland.6
6 Rentola, Kimmo, Niin kylmää, että polttaa: Kommunistit, Kekkonen ja Kreml 1947-1958 (Burning
cold: The Communists, Kekkonen and the Kremlin, 1949-1958). Helsinki: Otava 1997, 38-50.
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Finland's narrow room for manoeuvre dictated by the realities of foreign
policy was also reflected in economic matters. On 5 June 1947 the European
Recovery Program (ERP), later the Marshall Aid Plan, was announced and all the
European nations were called upon to participate. The Soviet Union, however,
considered the ERP to be a political offensive against it. It thus put pressure on
the countries within its orbit not to accept the aid nor to join the OEEC
(Organization for European Economic Cooperation) which was founded in April
1948 to coordinate the ERP.
Such  a  situation  was  very  awkward  for  Finland,  which  was  in  need  of
economic aid as much as any other European country. On 8 July 1947 the Finnish
Prime Minister was called to the Allied Control Commission and reminded that
the Paris Peace Treaty still needed to be ratified, that war reparations could be
hardened and that the 'arms cache' case referred to below was still unsettled.
Soviet pressure for Finland not to participate in the ERP and not to join the OEEC
can be seen as a major drawback economically for Finland. To compare the
position with other countries, Norway received in Marshall aid some 255 million
US dollars, and Denmark 273 million, while Austria received 678 million.
Sweden received conditional aid for 107 million US dollars against grants in
crowns to other European countries. In October 1947 the Soviet Union acted also
to  use  its  right  of  veto  to  prevent  Finland  becoming  a  member  of  the  United
Nations.
These incidents and developments reveal clearly enough the limited external
room for manoeuvre Finland enjoyed during these “years of danger”. On the other
hand, the ERP promoted indirectly the expansion of Finnish exports based on its
rich forest resources. Finland did not in fact join the OECD, which became the
successor to OEEC in 1961, until 1969. Finland never joined COMECON, the So-
viet counterpart of the OEEC.
The “arms cache” case, which became public knowledge in the autumn of
1946, was about the secret storage of weapons for 34 resistance battalions located
throughout the country. Furthermore, the records, equipment and certain personnel
of the Finnish military intelligence had been removed to Sweden for safekeeping.
Such measures, undertaken by Finnish headquarters officers to prepare for a
Soviet occupation of Finland, were a violation of the Armistice Treaty.7 There
was also an apparent reluctance by the Finnish authorities in tracking down and
punishing the guilty parties. The Control Commission was alarmed, suspecting an
even more widely-organized underground resistance. It seems likely, however,
that the effect was to make the Soviet Union more cautious in its dealings with
Finland. Only much later on it was learned, for example, that in Estonia the
Soviets had to work hard to repress postwar armed resistance.
In their desperate need of raw materials and other inputs needed to be
imported in order to settle its war reparations, the Finns in December 1944
asked for loans from the United States, where they had a reputation as a
country that paid its debts even during the Great Depression and the war
years.  Referr ing mainly to the experience after  the First  World War the
Americans, however, let it be understood that such dollars were not to be
given in order that the Soviet Union might receive its reparations. What
right have the Finns or any others to suppose that it is the policy of the
United States to give money to the Finnish mousetrap' was the
7 Nevakivi, Finnish security 22.
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answer, with Britain cautiously backing the Finns in order to obtain timber from
Finland.8
During 1945, however, US opinion changed, and by the end of 1945 Finland
was granted loans totalling some 40 million dollars from the Export-Import Bank
for the purchase of cotton, cereals, coal and steel,  trucks and machinery, but not to
be used for war reparations. In January 1947 loans worth a further 30 million were
again allocated.9 The interest rate was usually 3 per cent or less. Especially from the
summer of 1948 the US was aiming at minimize Soviet influence in Finland by
reinforcing Finland economically. Too much US economic support would have led
to Soviet countermeasures, and too little would have left Finland too isolated. On
the other hand, US military circles were intensively promoting full Swedish
membership of NATO, which would have meant very hard times for Finland.10
In 1945 Finland received loans only from Sweden. Later on loans were also
received from the United States, and from Argentina, Brazil and Colombia to buy
raw materials, especially coffee. The net amount of foreign long-term loans Finland
received during 1945-48 was $ 126 million. According to its foreign trade statistics
Finland paid out war reparations from September 1944 to September 1947 worth $
232 million.11
Finnish war reparations12
On 17 December 1944 the detailed War Reparations Programme fixed the prices of
goods to be delivered at the levels of 1938 increased by 10 per cent for con-
sumer goods and 15 per cent for capital goods, since the war reparations were to
be paid only in kind. A penalty clause called for fines of 5 per cent a month for
delays, with no force majeur clause. Deliveries of complex items counted only if
they were 100 per cent complete. Consignments could be cancelled, if they were
8 Heikkilä, Hannu, The Question of European Reparations in Allied Policy, 1943-1947, Studia Historica 27.
Helsinki: Finnish Historical Society 1989, 62-63.
9 Heikkilä, Hannu, Liittoutuneet ja kysymys Suomen sotakorvauksista 1943-1947 (with English summary:
The Allied Countries and the Question of Finnish Reparation to the Soviet Union, 19431947), Historiallisia
Tutkimuksia 121. Helsinki: Finnish Historical Society 1983, 202-208.
10 The US policies are treated by Jussi M. Hanhimäki in Rinnakkaiseloa patoamassa: Yhdysvallat ja
Paasikiven linja 1948-1956 (with English summary: Containing Coexistence: The United States and the
Paasikivi Line, 1948-1956), Bibliotheca Historica 10. Helsinki: Finnish Historical Society 1996.
11
Oksanen, Heikki and Pihkala, Erkki, Finland's Foreign Trade, 1917-1949. Studies on Finland's Eco-
nomic Growth VI, Bank of Finland Publications. Helsinki 1975, 26.
12
The problems of the Finnish war reparations have been dealt with in detail by many authors, including
Charles Kindleberger, Suomen sotakorvaukset (Finnish War Reparations Revisited) in Kansantaloudellinen
Aikakauskirja (The Finnish Economic Journal), vol. LXXXIII, 1987:2, 149-159; Susanna Fellman, Suomen
sotakorvaukset ja metalliteollisuus (Finnish War Reparations and the Metal Industry), in Historiaa
tutkimaan (Now We'll Study History), Ed. Jorma Tiainen & Ilkka Nummela. Jyväskylä 1996 discusses the
significance of war reparations for the post-war development of the metal industry.
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discovered to have defects after having been accepted. The level of fines rose to $
442,000, but only $ 175 000 were actually paid.13
In a report drawn up in 1946 by the United States intelligence services for
the Paris Peace Conference, the international burden of war reparations was
estimated as follows:
Only a quarter of the goods delivered as reparations consisted of Finland's tra-
ditional export items of wood and paper. The rest was made up of ships, machinery
and equipment and cable products which Finland had not been exporting before the
war. The Soviet Union itself had no shortage of timber, which well suited the United
Kingdom which badly needed Finnish timber. The war reparations paid to the Soviet
Union can be seen as a guarantee of co-operation in the future, since both the Finnish
metal industry and the Finnish shipyards became dependent on future Soviet orders.
Of the deliveries actually made in 1945, about 60 per cent consisted of wood and
paper, the rest being mostly ships from the existing merchant fleet. At the close of
1945 the war reparations schedule was extended from six to eight years, which eased
the delivery times for new ships and new machinery and equipment. In July 1948 the
outstanding amount of reparations was halved; the nominal total to be paid was thus
226.5 million US gold dollars. Comparable reductions were also made for Rumania
and Hungary. And at the end of 1948 Finland had in fact made payments amounting to
159 million 'war reparations dollars'.
There are several studies of the real value of the war reparations. One shows
that Finland would have needed 445 million US dollars if it had actually bought
from the United States the goods actually delivered in reparations. Another
estimate put the amount at 546 million at 1952 prices, while another put it at
570 million.14 The burden of war reparations at a percentage of the Finnish GDP
averaged 4.5 per cent annually between 1945-47, 3.3 per cent between 1948-49
and 1.5 per cent between 1950-52, calculated on the basis of the state expenditures
on them. In terms of Finnish industrial production the corresponding percent-
13
Suviranta, Bruno, Finland's War Indemnity, Svenska Handelsbanken, Index, March, 12,18-20, 23.
14
Pihkala, Erkki, Kauppapolitiikka ja ulkomaankauppa 1945-1986, in Sotakorvauksista vapaakauppaan
(Foreign Trade Policies and Foreign Trade 1945-1986, in From War Reparations to Free Trade): Kauppa- ja
teollisuusministeriön satavuotisjuhlakirja, Ed. Yrjö Kaukiainen & Erkki Pihkala & Kai Hoffman & Mauno
Harmo. Helsinki: Ministry of Trade and Industry 1988, 22-24.
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ages were quite high, at 32 per cent in 1945, but the deliveries then came partly
from the existing assets. In 1947 the figure was 15 per cent of industrial produc-
tion, 11-12 per cent in 1948-49, 5-6 per cent in 1950-51, and 4 per cent in 1952.
The Finnish success in discharging its reparation obligations was aided both
by good fortune (positive terms of trade, foreign credits, grants and gifts in kind
and by the Soviet relaxation of some of the most stringent aspects of the Armistice
agreement) and, as Charles Kindleberger put it, 'in major part to the intangible
reality of a national effort of will, something that ordinary economic analysis is
reluctant, and perhaps unable, to take into account'.15 The agency in charge of war
reparation procurement (SOTEVA) was given dictatorial powers to obtain
resources, but it had to use them only once. Industry willingly fulfilled the well-
paid orders.
Finnish foreign trade and the balance of
payments
The Finnish food supply proved to be a most serious problem in the autumn 1944.
In fact, the Swedish government created the very precondition for Finland's armi-
stice, since food and other necessities which had earlier been imported from Ger-
many  were  now  allowed  by  the  Allies  to  be  purchased  through  Swedish
channels.16 Sweden thus supplied in the winter of 1944-45 150,000 tons of
cereals, 10,000 tons of sugar, margarine and salt, as well as coal and coke, which
barely replaced the deliveries from Germany. In the spring of 1945, the Soviet
Union also sold Finland 30,000 tons of cereals and 1,300 tons of sugar. In
addition, some coal reserves had been accumulated in 1943. Mainly because of
these deliveries the volume of imports between October 1944 and May 1945 was
only a quarter of the level in the corresponding months in 1937-38, with exports
at only 4 per cent of the previous level. Sweden accounted for three-quarters of
these. It also sold some raw materials for war reparations on credit.17
The war reparations timetable and the actual list of goods were not in them-
selves a problem for the Finns. The main problem was to obtain foreign raw ma-
terials and machinery. Great Britain urgently needed timber and pulp, but not
paper.  It  was  thus  ready  to  buy  all  the  timber  Finland  was  able  to  deliver.  The
British initially offered only pounds sterling while Finland wanted a barter trade,
but after a Swedish intervention Great Britain agreed to sell Finland raw materials
and to pay partly in dollars when the trade began in August 1945.18 Coal was not
obtained from Great Britain, but Finland became an associate member of the Eu-
ropean Coal Organization which distributed the scanty stocks of coal. Finland also
became a member of other 'United Organizations of the Allied Powers' which
allocated raw materials among the different nations.
Trade with the Soviet Union was strictly bilaterally balanced and Finland
paid with wood and paper. Coal and coke were bought from Poland. The volume
of foreign trade recovered quickly in 1946-48 and the expansion was aided by a
15 Kindleberger, Suomen sotakorvaukset, 155.
16 Nevakivi, Finnish Security Policy, 20.
17 Pihkala, Kauppapolitiikka ja ulkomaankauppa, 29.
18 Heikkilä, Liittoutuneet ja kysymys Suomen sotakorvauksista, 115-121, 151-153.
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marked improvement in the Finnish terms of trade. A new trade boom came in
1950-51 because of the Korean war, and the first commercial deliveries to the
Soviet Union of Finnish metal industry products were made according to the 5
year trade agreement of 1950. (Table 1). The Soviet Union had secured for itself
by the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 a position of most favoured nation, which later
caused problems in relation to GATT and EFTA. The Soviet Union's share was
around  12  per  cent  of  total  exports  or  imports  in  1949-50.  Exports  of  paper  were
hampered by regulations on the use of paper in most Western European coun-
tries.19
The Finnish current account was at first kept in balance by a strict regulation
of both exports and imports. War reparations were partly reflected in the foreign
long-term indebtedness, whose increase had stopped by 1950 because of the export
boom caused by the Korean war. (Table 2). The value of net transfers and gifts in
kind (from Sweden, the United States, UNICEF, UNRRA, the International Red
Cross etc.) in 1946 represented 15 per cent of the volume of the reparation deliv-
eries.20 Import licenses were granted first of all to the war reparation industries
and secondly to the export industries. The recovery of imports for consumption
(Tables 1 and 5) thus lagged behind, although in 1948 more imports were allowed
for political reasons. At first foreign trade was conducted on a barter basis,
19
Pihkala, Erkki, Sopeutuminen rauhaan (Adaptation to Peace), in Suomen taloushistoria (The Economic
History of Finland) 2: Teollistuva Suomi, Eds. Jorma Ahvenainen & Erkki Pihkala & Viljo Rasila. Helsinki:
Tammi 1982, 349.
20
Bärlund, Ragni, Finlands betalningsbalans under återbyggnadsperioden, Publikationer utgivna av Fin-
lands banks institut för ekonomisk forskning, Serie A:12. Helsingfors 1951, 41.
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but after 1946 it was mainly based on bilateral trade agreements and clearing ac-
counts.21
Finnish debts to Germany from 1941-44 were agreed to amount to almost 60
million new Finnish markkas (6000 million old markkas). They were mainly paid in
1947-50 by deliveries of wooden prefabricated houses and by a hydroelectric power
plant constructed on a small area ceded (in the very north of the country) to the
Soviet Union in 1947. Inflation had eroded the value of these debts since the
original accounts were kept in Finnish markkas. In the meantime the Finns had had
time to produce a revised version of the accounts.
The markka was devalued three times in 1945 due to inflation. The rate of ex-
change with the U. S. dollar thus appreciated from 49.35 (in 1933) to 136 old-FIM.
The devaluations of July and September 1949 increased the rate to 231 old-FIM.
The September devaluation was connected to the 44.4 per cent devaluation of
the English pound and other Western European currencies. In 1948 Finland
21
Pihkala, Kauppapolitiikka ja ulkomaankauppa, 26.
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was able to join the IMF and World Bank (IBRD) and the par value of the markka was
fixed in the summer of 1951. Finland's accession to the GATT agreement was signed
in April 1950. In spite of this foreign trade remained strictly regulated until the end of
the 1950s.22
The settlement program and agriculture
Before the war 55 per cent of the Finnish people were dependent on agriculture
and forestry, mainly on family farms. In 1940 a settlement programme was ap-
proved to deal with the problem of the 422,000 evacuees from the areas ceded to
the Soviet Union in March 1940, but the reconquest of Karelia in 1941 changed
the situation. During the “Continuation war” land was also promised to soldiers.
The contemporary spirit of agrarian democracy considered small land holdings to
be the best means of solving not only the shortage of foodstuffs but also the
settlement problems, as well as promoting employment and equalising the income
and property distribution. A new law governing the acquisition of land for
settlement purposes was quickly passed in April 1945, it being politically neces-
sary  to  calm the  minds  not  only  of  the  evacuees,  but  also  the  frontier  soldiers  as
well as the widows.
Over one-half of the arable land or tracts of forest needed for the new farms
was taken from the lands owned by the state, local communities and parishes. The
rest was private land and expropriated from companies and private foundations,
from those not farming their land, and from the large farms, which were defined
as farms in excess 15 hectares of fields or arable land and/or big forests according
to a fixed scale. Areas populated by the Swedish-speaking minority (9 per cent of
the total population) were, however, excluded from the programme for political
reasons.  Because  of  the  marked  inflation  only  5  per  cent  of  the  2.8  million
hectares, which was redistributed to the 120,000 families who were settled, was
freely sold. The fields and timberlands expropriated were compensated at the
'reasonable prices' of December 1944 and paid for in state bonds yielding 4 per
cent annually and maturing in 1959. These securities were not inflation-indexed
like the bonds used to compensate the property lost by the Karelian refugees. The
payment of the loans granted by the state to the settlers was related to clearing and
building activities on the new farms.
Most of the new holdings were either 'dwarf farms (0.5-2.0 hectares) or
small holdings (2.1-5.0 hectares): by the 1950s the owners of these tracts were
faced with poverty and urgent need to find employment in other occupations. The
settlement programme had been mainly put into effect before 1948, but the stub-
born and traditional belief in land reform, dating from after the Civil War of 1918,
made Finland at the beginning of the 1950s the only (OEEC) country in which the
number  of  farms was  increasing.  Nevertheless,  it  was  notably  the  Agrarian  Party
which made the biggest advance in the 1948 parliamentary elections. Intimidation
by using the idea or threat of kolkhozes was in that election a much used political
tactic.
A production recovery to ease the strict rationing regime, particularly of food-
stuffs, and an improvement in the standard of living were essential to maintain
popular confidence in an economic system distorted by the needs of the war econ-
22 Pihkala, Kauppapolitiikka ja ulkomaankauppa, 26-27.
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omy. The settlement programme with its extensive land clearings to compensate for
the  lands  lost  in  Karelia,  some  12  per  cent  of  the  total  farmed  area,  was  reflected
only slowly in the volume of agricultural production (Table 3). This was partly
because of the weather conditions which were not as favourable as they had been at
the end of the 1930s and partly because of the settlement programme itself which
produced too small farms.
The high forestry production of 1945-46 (Table 3) resulted from the large cut-
tings of firewood undertaken both to employ the demobilized men after November
1944 and to help ease the acute shortage of fuel because of import-difficulties. The
timber needed for the war reparation industries and for export, as well as for firewood,
was expropriated from the forest owners at prices set by the government and which
lagged behind inflation. Compulsory cutting was stopped by parliament at the end of
1947, and a fuel shortage was avoided by coal import. But in 1950-51 the Korean
boom again boosted the cutting of timber.23
Finnish industrial production, 1945-1952
The volume of the Finnish Gross Domestic Product had already exceeded the pre-
war level by 1946, but the fruits of this recovery, especially in manufacturing, dis-
appeared to the east in the form of war reparations. Accordingly, the prewar level of
per capita GNP, was not reached until 1948.
Because of the needs of the war reparations industries, production, especially
23
Pihkala, Sopeutuminen rauhaan, 342-346, 348 and Hietanen, Silvo, Silta yli kuilun (The bridge over the
Chasm), in Kansakunta sodassa 3; Kuilun yli (A Nation in War, 3: Over the Chasm), Ed. Silvo Hietanen,
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for domestic consumption, suffered from a shortage of foreign currency for im-
ported raw materials. While the export of the products of the Finnish paper in-
dustry was affected adversely by import controls in many countries until 1950.
The replacement of women in production by former soldiers was one cause
of the lower productivity per worker in 1945. In 1948-50 the very slow increase
in employment was more than matched by rising productivity. The loss of Karelia
was significant for Finnish production. In 1938 Karelia had accounted for 10.7
per cent of the total industrial output, and in pulp production it had accounted for
a quarter, as was the case too in the capacity of electric power output, which
meant domestic electricity rationing continued until 1948. Harnessing the rapids
of the Oulu-river began during the war, and after 1948 these power plants made it
possible to discontinue the controls on the use of electricity. (see Table 4). The
use of coal remained controlled until the 1950s. Metals and engineering, and to
some extent the woodworking industries were stimulated by the war reparations
deliveries. Armament factories were converted to the production of war reparation
goods: machine gun factory turned to sewing machines and cannon factories to
parts  for  locomotives  and  paper-making  machinery.  There  was  no  need  to  build
new factories to meet the war reparations.
The controls over the construction industry were intensified, since the shortage
of coal and electricity had led to severe shortages of cement and nails. New hy-
droelectric plants and an improved national electric grid along with the needs of the
war reparations industries were given priority. The rest was centrally distributed
by licenses of the key building materials (nails and cement), for example to the
settlers for construction of necessary buildings made mainly of wood. Build-
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ing designs were also standardised, and the prevailing circumstances created mar-
kets for wooden, hand-made or used nails and shingles and other substitutes.24
At the end of the war and after the delivery of vessels to the Soviet Union as
war reparations, the Finnish maritime fleet had fallen to some 267,000 gross tons
or  less  than  40  per  cent  of  the  prewar  level.  Moreover,  most  of  the  remaining
vessels were leased in the summer 1945 to the Soviet Union until 1947. In fact,
only  22  ships  of  some  65,000  gross  tons  remained  in  1945.  These  vessels  had
central orders to transport coal and other raw materials for the war reparation
industries,  and  the  route  of  every  ship  was  to  be  reported  to  the  Allied  Control
Commission.25 But, as far as sea-going steamers and motor ships were concerned,
the Finnish merchant tonnage had regained its prewar level of some 600,000 tons
by 1950, thanks to the purchase of second-hand ships from abroad. A typical
vessel was thus a 'Victorian' steamer while windjammers as well as small sailing
coasters disappeared from the register around this time and the auxiliary tonnage
started to decline.26 With the cutting off of the important Saima Canal by the
boundary changes, previously significant inland water connections with the sea
ceased.
At the end of 1944 the number of motor vehicles registered stood at 15,000,
of which 4, 000 were cars. The pre-war level was reached by 1948, with imports
consisting mainly of busses and lorries, the import of cars not being totally
deregulated until 1963. A decline in railway traffic, especially passenger traffic,
began  at  the  end  of  the  1940s  as  a  result  of  the  increased  resort  to  trucks  and
coaches. Deregulation was reflected as a slight decrease in the volume of
communications.27
Only very modest increases of the allocated sales commissions were allowed
in 1945-47, while the distribution of consumer goods based on 1938 sales was
somewhat changed in favour of the co-operative wholesalers. The volume of
sales, however, increased notably. (Table 3). The use of neon advertising signs
was forbidden between 1941-49, but selling itself was not a problem, but rather
the getting of goods for sale. The founding of new shops was allowed in 1948. In
1946 consumers had 53 different ration card forms because there were more items
to be rationed than in the winter of 1944-45. The ration amounts increased and
more and more goods became freely available. During 1949 regulations of the
distribution system was mostly ended and in December that year the Ministry of
Supply was closed, its remaining tasks being distributed among other ministries.
After 1949 there was only one kind of ration card, and it itself became a matter of
history in March 1954. Then a new phenomen appeared; the sales.28
Providing housing for the refugees from Karelia, the evacuees in Lapland,
and for the returning soldiers was solved at first by the compulsory lodging of people
at rents fixed by government. Since rent rises were hardly allowed, the rent index by
1949 was only two and a half times higher than it had been in 1938, while fuel
prices and building costs were 11-12 times higher. The rents were thus often less
than the landlord costs. The use of fuel, light and hot water was closely regu-
24 Pihkala, Sopeutuminen rauhaan, 350.
25 Ibid., 352.
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lated in urban areas. Household appliances were virtually unknown except for
radios. The shortage of dwellings was relieved gradually, especially in the coun-
tryside. Already by 1946 the number of dwellings completed annually had sur-
passed the prewar level, while other building was still one-third down. After 1947
the gap in the rents between old and new dwellings became a serious problem. In
1949 a state-subsidized dwelling production system (ARAVA) was created, and
the rents payable for old houses were raised. Rent control was gradually abolished
over the 1950s.29
Banks and insurance companies suffered markedly from the inflationary
conditions  because  of  the  strict  controls  placed on interest  levels.  After  1935 the
Bank of Finland's discount rate, to which the other interest rates were tied, had
stayed at 4 per cent, but in June 1947 it was raised to 41/z per cent. In 1948 it rose
further to over 7 per cent, but went down thereafter for political reasons. Bank
lending was regulated according to the instructions of the Bank of Finland.30
Deposits were made tax exempt in 1946. At the end of 1945 the real value of the
credit stock, including those of the Bank of Finland and the National Insurance
Institution was 60 per cent of that in 1938, and in 1950 only 43 per cent. Credit
markets were, however, becoming more normal in 1949 as the postwar inflation
slowed.(Table 6).31
The provision of services recovered along with the growth of GDP. The total
volume of public services was adversely influenced by the dismantling of the reg-
ulatory system, but this was compensated for the increases in education and social
services provided by local communes reflecting the social legislation passed after
1947.(Table 3).
The  political  economy  of  the  postwar
restoration
Demands for food and other consumer goods in Finland grew impressively with
the growing real earnings of wage-earners as compared with prewar levels. The
dismantling of the 'hated' rationing system thus became an essential part of the
'incomes policies' pursued by the government. After the war the left wing parties
wanted to turn the extensive wartime powers of economic regulation in the direc-
tion of a planned economy. And in October 1947 a plan aiming at controlling all
kinds of economic activities by 'workers, consumers and small farmers' was actu-
ally promulgated. The right wing parties, however, advocated deregulation and a
return to a 'free market' economy. This ideological division was further spiced by
the political struggles over income distribution between wage workers and sala-
ried people, between rural and urban groups and between those in agriculture and
other occupations. Owing to the needs of the war reparations, the manufacturing
sector was in a key position in such bargaining moves. The real solution to such
disputes could only be met by increasing real supplies, that is by increasing
production or by direct imports. But both strategies suffered from a shortage of
foreign exchange to be earned by exports. Given these internal pressures and the
29  Pihkala, Sopeutuminen rauhaan, 351-352
30
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31
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external pressure, some socialist in character, time and the winning of a breathing
space was essential to preserve the existing social system.
The recovery of consumption. The winter of 1944-45 was very difficult with
respect to diet and general nutrition, clothing and other consumption (Table 5).32 At
first there was only enough foreign exchange to finance certain grain imports and
other necessities like sugar, but by 1947 the situation was easing somewhat and
imports of rice, coffee and citrus fruits could be afforded to some extent. By 1948
the total calorific intake per capita was being normalised through grain imports and
the improved supply of dairy products, and there were even some exports of butter
and meat. There was still, however, a shortage of luxuries, like coffee and tea, and
foreign travel was strictly controlled (Table 5). Imported items were still subject to a
license system.
Household disposable income was already higher in 1945 than during the war,
and in 1948 exceeded the prewar level. Income differences were levelling off to
some extent, and the pattern of consumption was different from that of 1938. Public
consumption declined until 1947 with military demobilization.
The new income distribution. During the war the real incomes of the lower
income groups had been maintained while higher income earners especially
among the salaried, suffered rather. This accorded with the distribution principles
of the rationing system. In 1944 consumer prices were twice and the wholesale
prices 2.7 times higher than in 1938, but in 1943-44, inflation was still modest due
to the heavy taxation. In 1945 inflation took off, since 'the demands of the
people' had forced the government to double the minimum wages in the spring. Since
32
Pihkala, War Consumption and Financing, 114-117.
42
the rise was 'solidaristic' or equal in markkas to all, industrial workers wages increased
by 50-100 per cent. In October 1945 the consumer prices were 84 per cent higher than
in  May  and  98  per  cent  higher  if  black  market  prices  are  taken  into  account.  Over
1945 as a whole consumer prices rose 99 per cent or 121 per cent including black
market prices.33 However,  the  rise  allowed  in  rents  was  only  6  per  cent.  It  was
argued, later on, that the inflation was in part politically welcomed: it
redistributed wealth and helped to liquidate the domestic state debt accumulated
during the war by a 'heavy inflation tax' imposed on those who had had to buy or
accept government bonds.
At the close of 1945 the Finnish banknotes in circulation were exchanged
for a new issue, but half of the large nominal value notes were taken as a loan to
the state to be repaid at the latest in 1949 with 2 per cent interest. This
compulsory loan accounted for nearly half of the loans taken up by the
government in 1946. This 'cutting of the bills' did not hamper the inflation, but it
captured the hot money to the bank accounts which were traceable by the tax
man.34
The inflationary spiral. In the spring 1946 the inflationary policies were
put on hold for a while and the wage increases allowed were only 8-15 per cent,
to be followed by a total price and wage -freeze until the end of the year. The rise
in
33
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consumer prices over 1946 was thus only 16 per cent or 18 per cent if black market
prices are included. 1947 began with a 5 per cent reduction in the prices of
manufactured products and a 20-25 per cent reduction in the progressive income tax.
Farmers' demands, their numbers now swelled by the new owners of holdings created
under the settlement programme were partly met by dismantling meat rationing in the
winter 1947. The price paid to the producer for milk was increased, and fertilizers
prices reduced, which meant more subsidies. The increased use of grain in the
production of meat meant that meat prices were suddenly 3-4 times higher. The badly
lagging salaries  of  civil  servants  had  to  be  increased  in  the  winter  of  1947 after the
threat  of  a  strike.  All  wage-earners  in  fact  received a  'solidaristic'  pay  rise  of  15 per
cent  on  average  in  May 1947. Rents  were  also  raised  by 20-25 per cent. In autumn
1947 the Central Organization of Labour Unions threatened a general strike. Wages
were consequently increased by 25 per cent on average, and prices were lowered by
increased subsidies and a reduction in the turnover tax. A 5 per cent rise in consumer
prices was to be compensated for by a 5.5 per cent rise in wages. A system of child
allowances was created. Then the grain farmers in their turn threatened a strike.35
There was a subsequent threat by the Central Organization of Labour Unions to
call a general strike to put pressure on the government. Governmental intervention to
control wages and prices began to be reduced in 1948, but was not discontinued
totally until the end of 1955.36
The Social Democrats were winning a ruthless struggle for the souls of the
workers in trade union elections as well as in the parliamentary election in July 1948.
External political pressures were also decreasing. Price control before these elections
was so strict that factories were simply closed: as a consequence during the summer of
1948 20-30 per cent increases in prices were allowed. In July the procurement system
for agricultural products was dissolved except for milk and grain. And by autumn
1948 about half of the most important foodstuffs had already been excluded from
rationing. In 1948 as a whole the rise in consumer prices was however, only 11 (or 10)
per cent because of increased imports of cheap food and reductions in indirect
taxation.
35 Ibid., 338-341
36 Salovaara, Säännöstellen selvittiin, 177-178.
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The domestic postwar inflation virtually ended in 1949 as the prices of agricul-
tural products turned down: the rise in consumer prices was only 3.5 per cent over
the year or minus one per cent including black market prices. On the other hand,
the heavy devaluations of the markka raised import prices, thus triggering a new
wages-price spiral in 1950, reinforced too by the boom caused by the Korean
war.37
The Finnish State Finances
The costs of war reparations and other legacies of the war, like the settlement and
reconstruction programmes, including loans to the resettled and general wartime
compensations are clearly reflected in the contemporary state expenditures.38 Af-
ter 1948 such financial burdens lessened, but there began the first indications of
expanding expenditures on the emerging welfare state and on other social objec-
tives like improving the badly rundown public infrastructure. (Table 8)
Legislation gave the municipal administrations new social responsibilities
after 1946 which were financed mainly by increased taxation and not by running
public deficits. Real state expenditures were thus by 1948 over twice and by 1952
three times higher than they had been in 1945.39 The rate of municipal taxation in-
creased from 7 to 9 per cent of total income in 1945 to 9-12 per cent of total
37
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income in 1950.40 The work of private relief organizations like the 'Kansanapu'
(People's Aid) were eventually taken over by the improved social security system.
The contributions made by UNICEF, UNRRA and other international relief organ-
izations should also be borne in mind. (See Table 2).
Before the war most of the capital expenditures of the state were real invest-
ments in state enterprises or in buildings, roads and bridges and in machinery. In
the post-war period over one third of the capital expenditures were loans, at first
to the settlers and after 1949 also to the state-supported housing corporations. In
1949-51 this item also included construction works to provide work for the un-
employed.
Total tax revenues were kept high by the progressive income tax and
especially, from 1945, by an extra wealth tax, a so-called expropriation tax:
inflation boosted the burden of these taxes.41 The yield of the sales tax and other
indirect taxes like customs duties and the excise taxes on 'stimulants' such as
tobacco and coffee increased, with the growing sales volume and imports. The
revenue from the State Alcohol Monopoly was, in contrast, clearly decreasing.
(Table 9).
The relatively modest budget deficits were thus financed by net borrowing,
and the cash deficits were no longer a problem. (Table 10).
Domestic debt and the cash debt owed to the Bank of Finland were both in
decline by 1946, not only in real terms but also absolutely: however, they were
more than replaced by increasing foreign indebtedness. Foreign debt, like the in-
dex-tied Special Liabilities on compensations arising from the war, were not to be
40 Official statistics in Finland 1950, 246.
41 Pihka la , War Consumption, 121.
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liquidated by inflation. The international level of inflation was at that time much
higher than the interest on foreign loans. However, the debt ratio to the GNP was
clearly declining. (Table 11).
As far as the government finances were concerned the worst was over by
1948, and after 1951 they can be considered normal. In 1952 Finland was
enjoying the fruits of the Korean war boom, the last war reparations deliveries
took place in September, Helsinki had the Olympic Games, and a Finnish maiden
won the Miss Universe contest. The people felt that the nightmares of the 1940s
were over.
In 1955 Finland was able to join the Nordic Council, and the United Nations
and the Soviets relinquished control of the Porkkala base to Finnish forces. For-
eign trade was liberalized in 1958-59. Finland opened her way to further Euro-
pean integration by concluding in 1961 an agreement of association with Euro-
pean Free Trade Association (EFTA).
Conclusions
The recovery of the Finnish post-war economy gained indirectly from the general
economic recovery of Western Europe, although Finland was not able to partici-
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pate  in  the  Marshall  Aid  programme.  Thanks  to  the  expansion  in  exports  to  the
west and some valuable foreign loans, Finland was able to finance its war repara-
tions and carry through its immediate domestic postwar tasks, the resettlement of
people and reconstruction, without hyperinflation. Inflation was mainly caused by
the need to raise wages and to end the rationing system for political reasons,
reasons accentuated by the postwar political situation with its strong popular sup-
port for socialist or communist ideas. Similar domestic political situations were at
that  time  prevailing  in  France  and  Italy  and  to  a  lesser  extent  in  Great  Britain.
Finland,  however,  bordered  the  Soviet  Union and was  bound to  that  state  by  the
war  reparations  and  the  other  peace  terms  of  a  lost  war.  Finland  was,  however,
able to find solutions of its own in these awkward political and economic situa-
tions, external and internal, and was able to slide little by little into the ambit of
western economic co-operation. In this context the Finnish upper and middle
classes were ready and willing to pay the bill but not to accept fundamental
change in the prevailing economic system between 1945 and 1952. The
contribution of the Finnish Social Democrats, in contrast to the Communists, was
also very notable, especially in the struggle for leadership in the trade unions.
This paper reminds us of the significance of political circumstances for the
room for manoeuvre in economic policy-making, a fact that is easily forgotten or
underestimated by economists. When considered in the light of the path-
dependency theory developed by Douglas C. North, the Finnish economic regime
did not in 1945-47 differ so remarkably in its content from that in a number of
other West European countries, although the character of single measures may
well have varied.42 But while the Marshall Plan and the OEEC and the coming of
Nato in 1949, made for decisive change in the economic regimes of Western
Europe (especially in West Germany), Finland was bound to continue on the path
established in 1945-48 because of her dependence on the Soviet Union, militarily,
politically, economically and partly ideologically and so stay outside the new
paths being pursued in Western Europe. Finland thus remained, in terms of
economic system and co-operation 'in between', since in Eastern Europe the new
path was one of socialism.
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